Debates in Singapore about immigration and naturalisation policy have escalated substantially since 2008 when the government allowed an unprecedentedly large number of immigrants into the country. This essay will discuss immigration and naturalisation policy in Singapore and the tensions that have been evoked, and how these policies are a key tool in regulating the optimal composition and size of the population for the state's imperatives. It will demonstrate that although the state has, as part of its broader economic and manpower planning policy to import labour for economic objectives, it seeks to retain only skilled labour with an exclusive form of citizenship. Even as the Singapore state has made its form of citizenship even more exclusive by reducing the benefits that non-citizens receive, its programmes for naturalising those who make the cut to become citizens which include the recently created Singapore Citizenship Journey (SCJ) is by no means burdensome from a comparative perspective. This paper examines policy discourse, key symbols and narratives provided at naturalisation events and demonstrates how these are used to evoke the sense of the ideal citizen among new Singaporeans.
Introduction
Debates in Singapore about immigration and naturalisation policy have escalated substantially since 2008 when the government allowed an unprecedentedly large number of immigrants into the country. While the citystate is essentially a migrant society, brought about through nineteenth century British colonial interests, Singaporeans have gained a heightened sense of national identity in the fifty years since independence. Being "Singaporean" is essentially, as in other post-colonial societies, manufactured through a series of founding myths and shared experiences. Founding myths include the meritocratic nature of the society, very different from its surrounding Southeast Asian nations where patronage, racial superiority and corruption are rife, and the importance of a strong state to ensure that the nation is able to survive against all odds (Rodan, 2004) . Shared experiences, such as a gruelling education system, life in high rise and exorbitant public housing, compulsory military service for men and the melange of cultural celebrations and cuisine further define Singaporeans' identity.
The fact that identity is amorphous and often only well defined in contact with the "other" is clearly demonstrated in the Singaporean case as new migrants come onto its shores. Despite the fact that many of those who come to Singapore are racially similar -from China and India, and the reality that many local born Singaporeans were themselves in a lineage of migrants originating from these same countries several generations ago, local born Singaporeans have asserted the difference between themselves and the newarrivals. There is some concern on the part of Singaporeans that this group of newcomers are not loyal to Singapore and do not share the essential characteristics of Singaporeans, particularly their unwillingness to adopt Singaporean norms and values (Yeoh and Lin, 2013; Chong, 2015) . Rather, new immigrants are sometimes known to show contempt to Singaporeans and refuse to shed markers of their former nationality. This essay will discuss immigration and naturalisation policy in Singapore and the tensions that have been evoked, and how these policies are a key tool in regulating the optimal composition and size of the population for the state's imperatives. It will demonstrate that although the state has, as part of its broader economic and manpower planning policy to import labour for economic objectives, it seeks to retain only skilled labour with an exclusive form of citizenship. Even as the Singapore state has made its form of citizenship even more exclusive by reducing the benefits that non-citizens receive, its programmes for naturalising those who make the cut to become citizens which include the recently created Singapore Citizenship Journey (SCJ) are by no means burdensome from a comparative perspective. However some of the additional tightening in recent years is a reflection of the need to shore up continued public support for immigration in the midst of growing strands of xenophobia and to continue manufacturing the ideal citizen.
We begin by outlining the context of discussing immigration in Singapore, before going on to trace the development of naturalisation policy. This essay defines naturalisation as the process of becoming a citizen, and hence, some discussion on the nature of Singapore citizenship is in order to inform an understanding of naturalisation policy.
Role of state in regulation
Singapore is often described as practicing a soft form of authoritarianism. While democratic elections are held, only one party, the People's Action Party has succeeded in forming the government since independence. The success of the PAP has been attributed to its ability to deliver economic and development goals to the nation, a priority which many Singaporeans accept. Election after election, the PAP's track record in keeping Singapore's economy vibrant and shielding it from the full impact of global economic threats, allows it to return to power with few opposition parties making inroads. In order to maintain its hegemony on the Singaporean psyche, the party has not only captured the nation's political and civic discourse but also wields substantial control over individual lives. Through directing how people live their lives, although often intrusive, allows it to achieve its economic objectives and thereby maintain its power base. An important regulatory mechanism that the Singaporean state wields is over the make-up of its population. In Foucault's (2003) writing on governmentality this is described as "biopower" "a technology which brings together the mass effects characteristic of a population, which tries to control the series of random events that can occur in a living mass, a technology which tries to predict the probability of those events (by modifying it, if necessary), or at least to compensate for their effects. This is a technology which aims to establish a sort of homeostasis, not by training individuals, but by achieving an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole form from internal dangers" (Foucault, 2003: 249) .
Immigration has been a key tool in this framework, in drawing and retaining skilled labour to the country with its exclusive form of citizenship (Vukov, 2003) . Unlike in other polities where immigration and naturalisation are the consequence of fairly random events such as war, persecution or economic opportunity, in post-independence Singapore it has been the result of careful planning to ensure the survival of the economic miracle that the ruling party so desires to perpetuate in order to remain in government.
Attracting foreign talent to Singapore's shores
The nation of Singapore has always been acutely aware of its small size and lack of natural resources, which feeds into the often repeated narrative of vulnerability and survival (Chan, 1971) . The narrative that human capital is the country's only natural resource often emerges in national speeches, where much has been invested over the years in the education system to ensure that its people are quality labour, with good skills sets to attract investors and global companies to its shores. Singapore has for at least two decades been mindful of the need to draw in skilled labour for it to compete on the global stage. In light of falling birth rates, the state has utilised the tool of immigration to ensure that it has sufficient skilled labour to compete in the global market (Low, 2001 (Goh, 1997) New immigrants from around the world, described by Prime Minister Goh as "foreign talent" would allow Singapore to be globally competitive, and make the transition to becoming a knowledge-based economy. Even before this there were programmes like the Professionals Information and Placement Service and the Committee on Attracting Talents to Singapore (Singapore Parliament Reports, 18 March 1981; Singapore Parliament Reports, 18 March 1983) . However the 1997 speech saw the government pitting Singaporeans against the foreigner who was described as essentially more "talented" and less encumbered by the relative success that was apparent in Singapore. For instance in observing the need for Singapore's national carrier, Singapore Airlines to recruit its star flight crew from outside the country, the Prime Minister remarked that his fellow Parliamentarian, "Charles Chong, an SIA engineer and MP for Pasir Ris GRC, says that when he travels by SIA, he knows immediately which girls are Malaysians and which Singaporeans. The Malaysians fold blankets better. They do it at home, whereas the Singaporeans get maids to do it for them." (Goh, 1997) The image of the able foreigner who was crucial for Singapore's competitive edge was further illustrated through the Prime Minister's discussion of soccer matches. As he aptly prognosed: (Goh, 1997) The National Day Rally Speech in 1997 pointing to the great need for Singapore to compete in the increasingly competitive Asian environment marked the start of a concerted push to bring in more immigrants, and this most recent wave of immigration. Initiatives to draw skilled labour in included the creation of the International Manpower Division within the Manpower Ministry, which oversees Contact Singapore offices that have been set up in global cities to attract competent individuals to work in Singapore (Ho, 11 November 2000) . The attempt to invite skilled labour to Singapore was an overwhelming success. Its outreach efforts and its skilful positioning during the global financial crisis allowed Singapore to draw in a very large number of foreign professionals. In 2007 alone it recorded an increase of 19% of nonresident foreigners on the island. Two years later, there was an 11% increase in those who were granted permanent residency. Singapore's comparative advantage in attracting desirable immigrants is based on its population's cultural affinity with those in East Asia and South Asia, its economic success, low taxation rates and high levels of safety and public order. Table 1 shows how the resident population size has increased dramatically over time, even as fertility rates have been on the decline, and below replacement levels. 
The exclusionary nature of Singapore citizenship
The efforts of the state were targeted at bringing in labour at all levels, from the high to low skilled (Yeoh & Lin, 2012) . Lower skilled labour such as what is needed in construction, domestic caregiving and manufacturing are however not accorded an immigration status which will allow them to be ultimately naturalised. They are not permitted to bring in their families or start new ones with Singaporeans. Their residence in the country is tied to their employer's needs. This differential eligibility for naturalisation restricted to highly skilled immigrants, is congruent to the state's intentions to get the best and brightest to remain in Singapore. The state views low skilled migration as transient and makes no effort in retaining this category of labour as citizens (Yeoh, 2006; Yang, 2014) .
Besides skill level, naturalisation is also tied with racial background. Singapore practices a hard form of multiculturalism where the state preserves particular racial identities through language recognition policies, quotas in housing allocation and in political representation. Chinese, Malay and Indian identities form the core of Singapore's cultural policies. The state has maintained that to ensure social stability it is necessary that the citizen population maintain the current racial composition achieved by the middle of the nineteen century with a 75% Chinese majority, 13% Malay, 9% Indians and a 3% catch-all, "Others". This has meant that there are quotas in place (although not made official) for the number of new immigrants who are granted permanent residency in the country. In recent years, for instance, the state has noticed its difficulty in attracting those of Malay origin to settle in Singapore partly because Bumiputera policies in Malaysia provide substantial benefits to Malays which they will lose if they accept Singaporean citizenship. Specifically, Minister in the Prime Minister's Office Grace Fu (2013) The exclusionary nature of citizenship is also apparent in the disallowing of dual citizenship and through the means of scholarship criteria. In recent years, the Singapore citizenship has been made even more exclusive by means of the reduction of social benefits for non-citizens.
No option of dual citizenship
The suggestion of dual citizenship has surfaced multiple times in policy discourse, but the state continues to disallow such an option. Discussions of dual citizenship often touch on offering that option to local born citizens, but only threads that address immigration will be discussed in this paper. The suggestion of dual citizenship has been mooted so that immigrants will be more likely to naturalise and socially integrate: "…allowing dual citizenship will enable us to attract more foreigners to take up citizenship, particularly when we have only 1.26 However, so far, the option of dual citizenship has not been implemented for the view that Singapore is a young and small nation, and creating a situation of divided loyalties would spell trouble for the country. This is a narrative that has been consistent through the past two decades as pointed out by the government: When skilled labour does commit to Singapore in the form of taking up citizenship, it would also entail buying into an exclusive form of formal national identity. Dual citizenship is disallowed, which would require any naturalising citizen to give up their former citizenship. Dual citizenship here acts as a mechanism that selects for individuals who would agree to an exclusive form of national identity and loyalty, at least in the legal sense of being a citizen.
Retaining skilled labour in Singapore
The clear intent of anchoring foreign talent to Singapore can been seen in narratives which touch on the fear that skilled labour may be in Singapore to better their chances of facilitating migration to greener pastures. This includes discussions on medical professionals like doctors and nurses who practise and gain registration in Singapore to better their chances of gaining employment in countries like the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom (Singapore Parliament Reports, 16 March 1973; 23 January 2007) . The stepping stone phenomena also applies to foreign academics and students. Suggestions of the role of Singaporeans in creating a greater sense of belonging, so that these skilled immigrants would feel a connection and want to remain in Singapore have been raised in the policy discourse (Singapore Parliament Reports, 21 As a result, the state has made deliberate attempts to keep skilled labour in Singapore at several key points. It does this through the medium of government scholarships to non-Singaporeans, some of which require these individuals to take up Singapore citizenship in the process of completing their scholarship (Singapore Parliament Reports, 28 February 2005; A*Star Graduate Scholarship, 2015).
In a similar vein, Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong said in 2010 that the government was "going to approach some of them [permanent residents] to take up Singapore citizenship. If they don't, then their PR will not be renewed". He further said that out of some 500,000 PRs in the country at that point, "maybe 50,000 can be selected to become Singapore citizens, the rest can be PRs contributing to the economy" (Chang, 9 September 2010) . A clarification on the statement was issued soon after PRs reacted on online forums, that "the figure of 10 per cent….was only for illustrative purposes. It is not a target, nor is it the case that all PRs who turn down the offer of Singapore citizenship would not have their PR status renewed" (Chang, 9 September 2010).
It is clear from a review of policy discourse that the state employs a strategy of both using formal instruments in the form of scholarships as well as persuasion in its strategy of managing the flow of skilled labour in its population.
Reducing benefits for non-citizens
The state has also moved to widen the gap between the social benefits that citizens and permanent residents receive, and in effect, creating a more exclusive form of citizenship. This had been in response to the public sentiment that skilled labour could receive the benefits that citizens could, without any of the obligations and burdens of citizenship. This section of the paper will take a look at the public and state discourse surrounding this development.
There had been the sentiment that many local born Singaporeans bear a disproportionate amount of the obligations of citizenship whilst receiving nearly the same amount of benefits as permanent residents (Hussain, 24 October 2009; Koh et. al., 2015) . This sentiment of inequity plays out especially with the perennial bugbear that new citizens beyond a certain age, as well as permanent residents do not have to perform national service, but that local born Singaporeans bear this burden.
Many public officials have then sought to reinforce the notion that immigration is for the benefit of all Singaporeans, in order to build popular and continued support for the inflow of skilled labour. In a speech to local university students that touched on immigration and population issues, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said: The state's discourse has relied heavily on pointing out that immigration policies work for the long term interests of Singaporeans, although in the short term Singaporeans may feel the strain owing to the large number of migrants.
"But in the midst of all this discussion about Singaporeans and non-Singaporeans, I think I should emphasize one point. And that is that in Singapore, the interests of citizens always have to come first. Not a short term interest but the long term interests of Singaporeans. And this immigration policy is to benefit Singaporeans in the long term, rather than to benefit non-Singaporeans at the expense of Singaporeans. It is to safeguard our long term interests that we need a sustained and a calibrated inflow of immigrants. But to make quite sure that there is no misunderstanding, we make a clear distinction between citizens and permanent residents and between PRs and non-residents. So when we have budget packages, CPF top
To clearly signal however that there is always a distinction between Singaporeans and foreigners, the state has also set out measures to provide differential subsidies whether it is with regards to Government-paid maternity leave and the Baby Bonus for new Singaporean citizen births.
The notion of "benefits" here corresponds to what is described as "rights" in most western liberal democracies. The government sought to reduce the social benefits that non-citizens would get in areas which include education, housing and healthcare. It also ensured various initiatives to recognise Singaporean contributions to national defence through the National Service Recognition Award that sees a sum of money (between $9500 and $10500) deposited into their Central Provident Fund and Post-Secondary Education accounts over a 10 year period. The various schemes would not only provide differentiation between Singaporeans and non-citizens but also the necessary nudge for permanent residents who have been in Singapore for some time to more fully commit to Singapore in renouncing their citizenship status from their countries of origin and becoming Singapore citizens.
Bringing new citizens into the fold
In the backdrop of issues of social integration, the government established the National Integration Council (NIC) in April 2009 comprising individuals from the people, private and public sectors to tackle the issue (National Integration Council, 26 April 2015) . In September 2009, the NIC set up the Community Integration Fund (CIF) that Singapore-based organisations can apply to use to bring about programmes that facilitate the social integration of migrants. To facilitate the process of naturalisation, the state implemented the Singapore Citizenship Journey (SCJ) in 2011, so that new citizens would become acquainted with the history, norms and values of the country. Such attempts in Durkheimian fashion bring about social integration through invoking key symbols and narratives
The SCJ stands as a key bridging point where aspiring citizens are introduced to the national symbols, values and institutions of Singapore. The presentation of the content of the SCJ would mean that when aspiring nationals become citizens, they will be able to participate in and connect with key symbols and narratives invoked in events like the annual celebration of the country's independence.
All citizens that naturalised after 2011 are required to undergo this journey as part of the process of becoming a Singaporean. The SCJ consists of four key components of an online component, a tour of historical landmarks and national institutions, a community engagement session, and culminates in a citizenship ceremony. From the comparative perspective, the requirements of the Singapore Citizenship Journey (SCJ) are not onerous. There are no compulsory language or citizenship quizzes, like in many receiving countries. The amount of time required to complete the citizenship journey is rather minimal, compared to some of the civic integration courses in other countries (Naturalisation, a better passport, 2011). There is even the deliberate effort to frame the SCJ as a rite of passage, or "journey" for new citizens.
Through the historical tour and online component of the SCJ, key national symbols and institutions are presented to aspiring citizens. The online component presents codified content on Singapore's "history and development as a country, key national policies, Total Defence, as well as…[the country's] efforts in building a cohesive and harmonious society" (National Integration Council, 2015b). The tour of Singapore's major historical landmarks and national institutions present physical symbols of Singapore's history and how the country "overcome[s] national challenges in the different domains of urban planning, transport, water resources, as well as security and defence" (National Integration Council, 2015b).
The third component sees aspiring citizens interact and engage with representatives and leaders from the community, which include appointed Integration and Naturalisation Champions (INCs), as well as grassroots leaders. It is described that new citizens will "learn how they can actively participate in the community", and that these community leaders will "share their experiences living in a multi-racial and multi-religious society, and provide valuable information to help new citizens better settle into their community" (National Integration Council, 2015b).
The Singapore Citizenship Journey culminates in a citizenship ceremony at the community or national level (National Integration Council, 2015b) . A speech is usually made by a state official, which works as a mechanism for bringing new citizens into the fold of the national narrative, is the manner in which state officials frame naturalised citizens as very much part of the history of an immigrant nation, where they are simply the latest to arrive on Singapore's shores: Key national values are communicated to new citizens at these citizenship ceremonies, which also serve as an opportunity for new citizens to demonstrate their alignment with them. Multiracialism, Singapore's variant of dealing with diversity sees the recognition and protection of four official racial groups of Chinese, Malay, Indian and Others. Multiracialism, as a national value is reflected in policy areas like public housing (ethnic quotas), political representation, and the celebration of national and community level events (Chua, 2007) . New citizens are in the citizenship ceremony, required to verbally demonstrate their commitment and resonance with national values through the recitation of the National Pledge, and singing of the national anthem. New citizens are also included in major national events, such as the country's 50 th year of independence. These key historical points present opportunities for the state to delve into the traits that it is central to the success and story of Singapore, and to invite new immigrants to be a part of this tradition: The call for citizens to contribute can be read as a policy balancing act, in response to the public sentiment that new citizens and permanent residents do not bear the burden of responsibilities that local born citizens do, as described earlier in this paper.
Conclusion
Citizenship scholars have written about challenges to the ability of national governments to control labour and capital flows (Sassen, 1996) . In the Singaporean case immigration and naturalisation policy are very much tools in the government's belt of managing its population for broader state objectives that include economic growth. The state has sought to, with an exclusive form of citizenship, encourage skilled labour to remain in Singapore.
While in many European countries there are reservations about implementing overly prescriptive regimes to dictate the character of immigration flows, the Singapore case illustrates how a nation state can pursue the course of selecting ideal migrants to supplement its projected labour needs. However expecting these immigrants to transit smoothly into a new identity as Singaporeans by giving up their previous citizenship and accept their responsibility to defend the nation is understandably not uncomplicated.
The Singaporean government has been realistic about the demands it can place on prospective new citizens. It recognises that the high skilled candidates it is pursuing for naturalisation have many more options internationally which may be more appealing. As such the Singapore Citizenship Journey and other requirements for citizenship have not been onerous -they are light touches which are meant to facilitate a basic appreciation of Singaporean values and ideals as well as an avenue to cultivate the kind of citizenry the state desires. These requirements most importantly seek to demonstrate to local born and bred Singaporeans that the citizenship process seeks to communicate to new citizens important national narratives.
While the naturalisation process for immigrants that make the cut is not overly demanding, Singapore state leaders expect that over time new Singaporeans and their children who grow up in Singapore will develop a sense of national identity. There is at least some reason to expect this -Singapore's unabashed construction of the "imagined community" through media and public education channels is pervasive. However the extent that state discourse will be able to shape identities might be a naive supposition on the government's part when considering new waves of migrants. With China and India playing a part as dominant world powers and them extending their reach to the global diaspora from their respective nations, there is little guarantee that new citizens from these countries will not continue to feel a strong affinity to their countries of origin. The outcomes of governmentality in managing its population plays out less clearly for Singapore when it comes into contact with similar intentions of the governments in sending countries. In all likelihood, naturalised citizens and even second-generation immigrants will continue to maintain multiple identities and a connection with their sending country. It may be much more realistic for Singapore to merely expect that naturalised citizens and second-generation immigrants will feel enough of an emotional connection to Singapore that will allow them to do their best to contribute substantially to the well-being of the city state.
